Towards July 36 and beyond

— New Age/ Mehedi Haque

by Obaidul Hamid

THE 5th of August 2024 is a red-letter day in the history of Bangladesh. Since the country’s birth in 1971, no other day has been more significant in the life of the nation. The date invited such worthy — although contested — labels as ‘uprising,’ ‘revolution’ and ‘second independence’. Regardless of how we name the day and bring it into being, neither the achievement nor the associated human cost can be underestimated.

The day saw Bangladesh’s freedom from the longest-lasting autocratic rule in its history. The ‘second independence’ dawned as a military helicopter flew the so-called iron lady to her safety across the borders. While the millions marching towards Hasina’s official residence would have been disappointed not to be able to greet her with a mass greeting, imagining a Bangladesh without her had probably been enough as gratification at that moment. They had waited many years for such a moment. Many didn’t live long enough to see their wish come true. They patiently suffered all sufferings that can be imagined in a despotic regime. They gave all that was demanded — life, dignity, sovereignty, and material and immaterial possessions. Even then, they were just clueless as to how Sheikh Hasina could be unseated from power. Over the years, she had developed clever strategies for self-protection and political sustenance — by controlling language, streets, people, and institutions. No one could find the much-needed Achilles’s heel — there was no way of sending a Trojan Horse into her government machinery.

However, the bad news for dictators is that their reading of the future is not always the most accurate reading. Although they install rules of terror, they can’t plug all holes in their governing vessel. Years of success in control and repression give them not only confidence but also arrogance. They start feeling that they were travelling close to the state of being invincible. On several occasions, Hasina and her close circle publicly aired this sense of protectiveness and invincibility. She even said that a Hasina never runs away. Such public assertions only proved to be what we call ‘dramatic irony’ — her final flight revealed that much of whatever she had said earlier was either false or the opposite of reality.

Sometimes the way out of bondage or the way towards freedom is unimaginable. One may not call it divine intervention, but logic may not have the full capacity to explain freedom when it lands like an unbelievable reality. That also tells us about the limits of human planning — while not all our plans lead to their desired results, sometimes even our small plans can bring results greater than expected.

As we now know, what started as a quota reform movement by the students in June 2024 had no intention or capacity to be translated into a ‘revolution.’ Such movements were a cup of tea for Hasina’s forces, as they had contained many of them earlier. Bringing the regime down was not linked to the student uprising, at least initially. However, things unfolded rather quickly, not so much because of the movement itself but because of how the government responded through its language, media, and military. Hundreds of students were killed in brutal manners; thousands were arrested from wherever they could be found across the country. All of Hasina’s forces were mobilised to control the situation, using even lethal weapons, if needed. However, she did not know that the line had already been crossed and that there was no return. All dictators should know that there is indeed a line — however invisible that may be in their coloured vision. As time matures, it becomes not only visible but also indomitable, despite all their might. This is a lesson taught by history as a universal pedagogue.

Beyond 36th July

SUCCESSFUL revolutions probably evoke more hopes and dreams than can be delivered. The prolonged bondage and enduring pain only intensify the desire for freedom, a better life, and living. That should be true about the July 2024 uprising. Except for the beneficiaries of the Hasina regime and the Awami League’s ideological children, all Bangladeshis fervently wished to see the end of her time. Even those in the diaspora hardly ever passed a day without spelling out that wish. Many browsed Bangladeshi news platforms every day to read what they wanted to read. Their excitement might not have been measurable when indeed they could read the most newsworthy news — Hasina’s fall and flight.

It’s been a year since that dream-come-true moment came. Naturally, people at home and abroad are assessing what has been achieved and what remains unachieved during this time. Such assessments are popular social and political practices that often draw comparisons between different times and regimes. These practices can ensure accountability and secure renewed commitment from the ruling authorities to their citizens and the nation. However, not all evaluations are guided by dispassionate, objective analysis. The criteria for such assessments also vary, leading to different conclusions.

Has Professor Yunus’s interim government delivered people’s hopes and aspirations as they came out of the dark days of an autocracy a year ago?

The answer will depend on who we ask. The lived experiences of the masses will give an answer that may not be aligned with that of political parties. On the other hand, those affiliated with Hasina’s rule would probably consider the interim government the worst regime in Bangladesh’s history. Even media writing of the government’s report card is likely to be coloured by their own ideological and/or commercial interests.

Instead of passing wholesale judgements, what is probably more educative is to rationalise things.

A mass uprising or movement is usually guided by a singular goal — the goal of getting rid of an oppressive ruler in the present case. Such movements may not have clear plans beyond that goal, which may also be hard to imagine. Seeing beyond the climax requires a different set of dynamics, not always incorporated into mass movements. This is particularly the case for the July 2024 uprising, which was led by students. Although the student coordinators have demonstrated competent leadership in many ways since Hasina’s departure, we cannot expect from them what we would usually expect from professional politicians leading movements for regime change.

In hindsight, some challenges faced by the interim government can be attributed to the form of government adopted after Hasina’s fall. In a context of grave uncertainty, anxiety, and potential civil chaos, the government that was quickly formed was based on what the nation was already familiar with — that is, a caretaker government. The temporal pressure might have given no scope to consider other possibilities. Looking back, what could have been a more appropriate choice is a revolutionary government with broader and more encompassing terms of references.

The government’s achievement in the past year may not be undermined. Ensuring public safety and managing the economy will probably be the hallmarks of their success story. However, occasionally, the functioning of the government has given the impression of confusion about its scope and authority. It may have been unclear what was within its mandate and what was not. For example, while it launched many commissions for institutional reforms, there have been complaints about not forming an education commission. This question cannot be put aside, particularly when there was a commission for women that ended up with controversies, overshadowing its achievements. Although critics mainly targeted the commission members, the government deserved some of the blame. The slow progress in bringing Hasina and her close circle and those involved in killings and human rights violations to justice will be negatively scored by many. Not adopting what is called the July Charter as a priority is another contention.

The interim government, by definition, is a technocratic government, not a political or popular one. It has a fixed set of agendas to pursue during its relatively short tenure. Reforming institutions and preparing the political ground for the nation’s return to the normal political process are their key businesses. Political parties may not expect such a government to set national missions and visions. The government itself may also be unclear how far it could go with its reforms and other agenda.

The time after a regime change through mass uprising is a time of uncertainty and lack of clear direction. So many things may deserve attention that the incoming rulers may simply be overwhelmed by the volume of work. And if economics is an unavoidable question, then things become even more complex. This is certainly the situation that was inherited by the interim government. Given their lack of experience in running a government in a difficult time, not everything is likely to go smoothly. The honest and unequivocal acknowledgement of the chief advisor about who they were and how they did things may have added a new dimension to the dominant political culture of hiding, avoiding truths, and giving false promises.

It’s true that the interim government garnered wider support and commendations during the first few weeks and months of its tenure. This was a popular expression of a shift away from the corrupt and incompetent political culture in Bangladesh. Many who were sick of conventional politics have wished to see Muhammad Yunus continue for five years. That popular wish may not have totally evaporated, although its popular base may have already weakened somewhat.

A ruler is never a magician, and governing is critically hard work. This is particularly so when one rules a divided society such as Bangladesh — politically, economically, socially, educationally, culturally, and religiously. Nationalism in Bangladesh has remained elusive, which has failed to bring different groups together. The divides are so encompassing that there are different positions even on such questions as sovereignty, centre of control, and national interests.

Muhammad Yunus or his colleagues can’t play magical tricks to impress these diverse groups of people. At the same time, it will be naïve to say that those who are running the government are without their own agenda or interests, whether implicit or explicit.

Despite all underachievement, weaknesses, and limitations, we need to maintain our sense of optimism. In no way can any failure be used to justify the return of the Hasina regime that we have just left behind. As the interim government is working towards the general elections, they deserve wholehearted support from each and everyone. Ultimately, we need to pin our hopes on democratic political processes and political parties and their leaders.

 Obaidul Hamid is an associate professor at the University of Queensland in Australia. He researches language, education, and society in the developing world. He is a co-editor of Current Issues in Language Planning.