Who’s leading whom in post-Hasina Bangladesh?

— New Age/ Mehedi Haque

by Helal Mohiuddin

August 5, 2024, marked a pivotal moment for Bangladeshi students and youth, as they challenged the authoritarian structure of Sheikh Hasina’s regime. This date also facilitated the emergence of Bangladesh’s Nobel laureate, Dr Muhammad Yunus — a prominent figure embodying national pride and dignity — who agreed to enter the political arena as the new interim leader: unelected, constitutionally contentious, and already facing significant challenges. However, as Pareto and Mosca remind us, revolutions rarely disrupt elite cycles; rather, they tend to replace one group of leaders with another. The central question thus emerges: Are these new leaders destined to conflict among themselves?

Sheikh Hasina cultivated pronounced political divisiveness in Bangladesh. The narrative she propagated among party loyalists and supporters was consistently characterised by extreme ultra-nationalist and ultra-conservative strategies. The binary oppositions — ‘Muktijoddha and Razakars,’ ‘anti-Muktijuddho-pro Muktijuddho,’ and ‘secular-reactionary’ — became hollow slogans, often echoed uncritically by party members lacking understanding of their true meanings. Party loyalists claimed to represent a ‘secular’ party, despite the party’s activities being defined by orthodox conservative principles and authoritarian methods. Secular parties typically seek to align national strategies with the pace and benefits of globalisation, which Hasina’s party did not pursue. Instead, it employed the most robust domestic political intimidation tactics, fostering societal division and enabling ruling elites to accumulate state resources and reinforce an oligarchic order.

The political landscape shifted dramatically with the so-called July Revolution. The mass uprising generated optimism for a transformation from a rogue state to a people’s republic. Inviting Yunus to lead a government without a parliamentary mandate inevitably sparked constitutional debate. Article 56 of the constitution stipulates that the head of government must be a member of parliament, which Yunus is not. Nevertheless, on August 9, 2024, the Supreme Court validated his authority under the ‘doctrine of necessity’ — ‘the government of the people’s will.’

Pareto’s ‘iron law of oligarchy’ and Mosca’s elite theory suggest that power does not dissipate but is instead redistributed. Yunus’s interim cabinet is not an improvised democracy; rather, it is composed of prominent civil society figures, economists, student activists and former military officials — essentially a reconstituted elite, albeit in a more modern guise. Instead of uniting the anti-Awami League forces before the anticipated election, this cabinet inadvertently caused previously anti-fascist groups to fracture into opposing factions.

Despite these controversies, Yunus’s administration persists, as elites from diverse sectors have accepted him as a unifying figure and have demonstrated their respect for the popular mandate supporting Dr Muhammad Yunus. In a recent conversation during a cricket match in Dhaka, a friend wryly remarked, ‘We swapped Hasina’s limousine for Yunus’s bicycle of legitimacy’ — perhaps the most poignant and ironic observation of the month.

The intention of this analysis is not to diminish the significance of the Yunus government. My recent discussions with ordinary citizens indicate a generally favourable disposition towards Yunus. He is admired, respected and trusted, and many believe that his administration is performing satisfactorily and will continue to do so until power is transferred to an elected government. Citizens particularly note reductions in corruption and informal extortion, improved electricity supply, and the affordability of daily necessities, despite ongoing challenges in law and order.

Nonetheless, it has become apparent that new forms of political divisiveness are rapidly supplanting previous patterns. The current fragmentation among political forces is exacerbated daily by minor incidents and the varying scope and scale of the interim government’s reform agenda. Consequently, national unity remains elusive. Factionalism and post-revolutionary fragmentation are increasing among the same student activists who previously collaborated to unseat Hasina.

As student activists now confront bureaucrats and military leaders, each action further erodes unity. The coalition is devolving into factionalism. Without the restoration of trust and the legitimisation of institutions, electoral credibility may collapse. Public cynicism may ultimately result in widespread polling chaos and conflict, undermining the legitimacy of any electoral outcome. Reflecting on this growing fragmentation, a friend commented, ‘Yunus is the only man who could unite everyone by quitting.’ This remark referred to Yunus’s expression of dissatisfaction and his implied threat, two months previously, to resign from the position of chief adviser. His statement prompted the various contending political parties to convene to prevent an impending constitutional crisis and ensuing chaos.

Elections are imminent yet remain stalled. Yunus has proposed holding polls between December 2025 and June 2026, while opposition forces — particularly senior members of the BNP, many of whom are former ruling elites — have continued to demand a specific election date before February 2026, threatening unrest until Dr Yunus met with Tareq Rahman in London in May of this year.

A divided interim commission has been unable to finalise a caretaker government model, and judicial independence continues to be elusive. On July 16, the NCP’s ‘March to Gopalganj,’ organised under the umbrella movement ‘July Podojatra,’ turned violent; several individuals died as government forces, the banned Bangladesh Chhatra League, and Awami League supporters clashed. This incident indicates that the power elites of the deposed Awami League are actively seeking a political resurgence. The situation may precipitate a tripartite clash among the sympathising parties of the interim government, the BNP on the ground, and the Awami League operating from the underground.

Factionalism and fragmentation: infighting among emerging elites 

WITHIN months, the revolutionary coalition began to show signs of division. In October 2024, Yunus inadvertently ‘reset’ history, an action some interpreted as a rewriting of national memory. The result was judicial turmoil: Chief justice Obaidul Hassan and a dozen others resigned within a single week, prompting protests outside the Supreme Court. Student leaders denounced these events as a ‘judicial coup’ in progress.

By February 2025, the interim regime initiated ‘Operation Devil Hunt’ — a crackdown on Hasina loyalists, resulting in the arrest of over 11,000 individuals without transparent charges. Rather than ‘moving fast and breaking things,’ the regime appeared to be moving fast and breaking trust. Within Yunus’s administration, advisers frequently directed blame at one another. As one diplomat quipped: ‘Working here is like trying to herd goats — except the goats think they’re lions.’

A key feature of elite circulation is that new power elites often entrench their authority by fostering divisive politics and fragmentation. Historical examples abound in which revolutions that once inspired high hopes for national unity ultimately resulted in frustrating divisiveness. After the 2011 revolution in Tunisia, a coalition of secularists and Islamists ousted Ben Ali, only to fracture during subsequent elections. Following the 1979 revolution in Iran, a broad coalition replaced the Shah, but soon devolved into a new authoritarian regime.

Iran’s revolution began with unity but concluded in clerical dictatorship. Tunisia’s liberal ideals were ultimately co-opted by Ennahda. In Bangladesh, the NCP also traces its roots to the student movement, but is now fracturing under pressure. Jamaat-e-Islami has returned to mainstream rallies at Suhrawardy Udyan, emboldened by the new political climate. Meanwhile, the BNP perceives an opportunity and is preparing for a coalition challenge in the 2025 elections.

Bangladesh has exhibited early signs of a similar transformation. In March, students within the NCP reported internal leadership crises after Hasnat Abdullah accused the military of ‘reinventing a better Awami League,’ which led to disputes with the military and campus protests. Even more symbolically, in February 2025, a ‘bulldozer march’ that destroyed Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s home — historic Dhanmondi 32 — sparked nationwide political divisions. The marchers created the impression that the mural of Sheikh Mujib is now seen as a symbol of chaos rather than a coalition.

Many staunch anti-Awami League activists regarded the Dhanmondi 32 demolition as a resurgence of mob politics. There is widespread public perception that the interim government either condoned or ignored the rampage. State-level silence and inaction in response to the large-scale Dhanmondi 32 incident, in effect, benefited the governing elites by consolidating their support base and power.

Fragile hope and the imperative of vigilance 

BANGLADESH stands at a pivotal historical juncture, where hope and uncertainty compete for primacy. Although the post-Hasina era has generated optimism among citizens, the persistent threat of elite manipulation endures. While revolutions may undermine their progenitors, they are not destined to compromise the future. The forthcoming elections will be a critical test of whether the interim coalition can transcend factionalism. It is essential to maintain vigilance regarding the actions, influence and manipulative strategies of powerful elites, particularly emerging business tycoons and oligarchs. While optimism persists, it must be coupled with collective vigilance if Bangladesh is to effectively safeguard its democratic aspirations.

Dr Helal Mohiuddin is director of research and communication at the Conflict and Resilience Research Institute, Canada (CRRIC) and a sociology professor at Mayville State University, North Dakota, USA.