Fall of fascism and the burden of hope

by Mostofa Nazmul Mansur

AUGUST 5, 2024. This date is, perhaps, the most significant date in post-independence Bangladesh. On this day, the end of nearly one and a half decades of autocratic, authoritarian rule — considered by many to be ‘fascist rule’ — came about through an unprecedented popular uprising that began under the banner of an anti-discrimination student movement, with students initially and later the combined participation of students and the masses. It was a bloody popular uprising that will remain in history as a symbol of both the courage and self-sacrifice of the student-public, and the injustice and brutality of the dictatorship. The ultimate victory of courage and self-sacrifice against injustice and brutality, which was secured through the fight and defeat of the former dictator, turned this popular uprising into a momentous event.

Sacrifice and blood have value. This great popular uprising, achieved through the sacrifice and blood of thousands, has given us the opportunity to dream anew. Through the success of this uprising, a renewed aspiration has awakened within us — to build a democratic Bangladesh that is modern, tolerant, inspired by the spirit of equality, free from discrimination, and grounded in higher values. This is the enduring aspiration the nation has been struggling to realise since 1971. The unparalleled 1971, the courageous 1990, and the bloody 2024 — all represent a unified and relentless struggle to realise this enduring aspiration of the past 50 years. In each of these struggles, we have achieved initial victories — in 1971, we won independence; in 1990, we overthrew autocracy; and in 2024, we succeeded in defeating a one-and-a-half-decade-long fascist, autocratic ruler.

But alongside our initial successes, there also exists a painful record of failure in building the democratic Bangladesh we have aspired to. After the initial success of establishing an independent Bangladesh in 1971, an autocratic system of governance began to take shape, which culminated in the one-party, fully autocratic regime known as BAKSAL in 1975. The formation of BAKSAL severely undermined our national aspiration. Similarly, the initial success of the 1990 popular uprising was lost due to the political leadership’s failure to implement the Joint Declaration of the Three Alliances. Now, through the bloody uprising of 2024, we have defeated the autocratic-authoritarian fascist ruler and gained our third opportunity. Will we once again follow the old pattern of failing to fulfil the national aspiration after an initial success? Or will we truly be able to rise this time and carry our initial victory towards its ultimate goal — successfully building a democratic Bangladesh that is modern, tolerant, inspired by equality, free from discrimination, and grounded in higher values? Any politically conscious person would feel anxious and uneasy when faced with these two possibilities.

Whether we can truly build the Bangladesh we aspire to in the post-2024 period depends largely on the steps and actions taken by the current interim government led by Professor Muhammad Yunus. Although this interim government is not democratically elected, it enjoys broad public support, with backing from a large segment of the population as well as from nearly all active political parties. Except for the brief three-month caretaker government led by Justice Shahabuddin in 1990, no other administration in Bangladesh has enjoyed such widespread public support as the present interim government. Public support strengthens a government, and in that sense, this is an exceptionally strong administration. The government must recognise this strength and, with the national aspiration in view, take impartial yet decisive actions. Its success would represent a critical step towards the full realisation of our national goals. But is the government truly moving in that direction? Are its actions decisive and aligned with the aspirations of the people?

Some of the current interim government’s actions — particularly in the economic sector — have been praised for addressing the chaotic situation left behind by the former autocratic regime. The government’s decision to sign the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance is undoubtedly a positive step. Its initiative to establish an office of the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Dhaka can also be considered a commendable move. These actions may play a significant role, by international standards, in promoting justice, equality and tolerance. Although a few individuals associated with the government have faced some scrutiny, overall, the administration has so far remained free from financial scandals. At the very least, it has not institutionalised corruption in the economy like the previous regime, nor has it fostered a culture of administrative corruption. The practice of enforced disappearances under state patronage has come to an end, and incidents of police repression have somewhat declined. While political intolerance towards television and print media still lingers — and self-censorship by these media outlets persists — there have been almost no notable cases of media intimidation through state power, as was common during the autocratic era. Following the recent heartbreaking plane crash, the government’s disaster response has shown signs of success, although some aspects of it have come under question.

But the current government’s record of success is not particularly rich. As unfortunate as it may be, this truth cannot be denied. From day one, the government began by saying and doing the wrong things — and regrettably, it was the chief adviser himself who initiated this pattern. Just after assuming office, he made a mistaken statement: “The students are our primary appointers.” Even while acknowledging that students led the popular uprising and that it was they who called upon him to take office, it must still be said — clearly and unequivocally — that in a modern state, the mandate to govern comes from the people as a whole, not from any specific profession, community or group. Of course, the chief adviser is not a politician, and one might have dismissed this as an emotionally charged political misstatement if it had not left a lingering influence on his subsequent actions. However, there exists a public perception that he took that statement quite literally, and that both he and members of his advisory council continue to act with that view in mind. His initial misstatement laid the foundation for a flawed policy: instead of quickly returning students to their campuses and academic pursuits after the uprising, the government chose to incorporate student representatives into the state machinery and administration — a decision widely seen as misguided.

The second major misstep taken by this government, immediately after assuming office, was its failure to clearly communicate to the public the duration of its tenure. In a modern state, no government can exist without a defined term of office — such uncertainty might be found in monarchies or various autocratic systems, but not in a democracy. Vague and abstract statements like “We will leave whenever the people say so” are not an acceptable way to address the question of a government’s tenure. It is precisely this ambiguity that has led to the circulation of slogans on social media such as “We want this government for five more years,” which, disturbingly, many government-affiliated individuals have enthusiastically shared. Even more concerning is the fact that individuals directly associated with the government have made statements such as “What have the politicians done in the last 53 years?” and “We had to take responsibility because of the politicians’ failures.” Such remarks may reasonably be interpreted as attempts to justify extending the government’s tenure indefinitely or removing any time limit altogether. But leaving the government’s tenure open-ended is not only contrary to the principles of modern governance and democracy — it also goes against the very spirit of the 2024 popular uprising. The students and the people who gave their lives in that uprising did not sacrifice themselves to establish yet another unelected, undemocratic regime. On the contrary, they overthrew an unelected (there can be no legitimacy in calling a fraudulently formed regime an ‘elected government’), undemocratic fascist government. The current interim government must, therefore, always remember that it was appointed temporarily in response to an extraordinary situation, and its primary responsibility is to manage that situation and lead the country back to a democratic path — where an elected government, formed through the people’s vote and bound by a constitutionally defined term, will govern in accordance with democratic norms. Yet, the words and actions of many individuals affiliated with the government suggest that they neither think of the situation this way nor truly understand it.

Another major misstep taken by the government early on was its failure to clearly articulate the priorities of its mandate. While routine administrative functions and the restoration of democratic order were both important, the interim government’s foremost priority should have been to address the aftermath of the popular uprising. This included providing compensation to the families of the martyrs, ensuring the highest standard of medical care for the injured, and initiating lawful proceedings against the fascist rulers, the fascism enablers — those who facilitated the rise of fascism, such as former chief justice Khairul Haque and pro-government journalists as an institution — and the fascism intensifiers — those who exacerbated its cruelty and violence, such as former IGP Benazir Ahmed and the Rapid Action Battalion as a security force. Unfortunately, these objectives do not appear to have received the attention or urgency they deserve.

A complete and verified list of martyrs is yet to be published, let alone proper compensation delivered to their families. Complaints of discrimination and negligence in the treatment of the injured have become commonplace. Although one cannot say that no steps have been taken to bring the fallen fascists to justice, credible concerns have been raised about the sincerity and consistency of those efforts. Many observers believe the government is adopting a ‘choose and pick’ approach — selectively targeting individuals rather than acting according to a principled or comprehensive strategy. A recent example is the case of former chief justice Khairul Haque, who played a key role in legitimising the fascist regime. Despite his central involvement in that regime — as one of its enablers — he had been living in Dhaka for nearly eleven months, apparently unbothered and unnoticed by the law enforcement agencies, before any action was taken. This has led to a reasonable perception that he was deliberately not ‘chosen’ for prosecution until the government — due to reasons still unclear — decided in late July 2025 that it was time to act. His eventual arrest appears more opportunistic than principled, thereby reinforcing suspicions of inconsistency in the government’s pursuit of justice. Besides, there are reports that the government is preparing to sign various international agreements unrelated to immediate national priorities. If these reports are accurate, such actions would constitute a serious overreach. It must be remembered that the mandate to enter into long-term international treaties belongs exclusively to an elected government, not an interim one. When the chief adviser’s press secretary declares, “We got mandate to do everything,” it is difficult not to conclude that some within the administration are either unaware of — or indifferent to — the fundamental distinction between a popular interim authority and a constitutionally elected democratic government.

The interim government’s inability to control and eliminate the recent waves of mob violence is another significant failure. Given the emotional trauma and grievances of people in the immediate aftermath of a bloody popular uprising, some incidents of mob violence might have been anticipated. However, the continued occurrence of such violence months later cannot simply be seen as spontaneous expressions of anger by those harmed by the fascist regime. To view them as such is politically naive. Many of these attacks have been deliberately orchestrated to serve personal or group interests. Even more concerning is that much of this violence has been planned and executed by far-right political activists targeting women, progressives, liberals and dissenters — many of whom were outspoken opponents of the fascist rule and active participants in the uprising. These far-right groups have even attempted to impose their preferred dress codes within various government institutions. Regrettably, the interim government has failed to take strong action against these acts of mob violence and has shown little determination to curb the rise of far-right extremism. Instead, referring the perpetrators merely as “pressure groups,” government officials have, whether knowingly or not, extended a degree of tacit tolerance to their actions. As a result, those responsible for mob violence continue to operate with impunity, sometimes even issuing explicit or implicit threats to intimidate and silence opponents through mob attacks. In short, the absence of sufficiently firm government action, combined with a degree of implicit leniency, has allowed mob violence to escalate into mob terrorism, raising serious concerns about the potential re-emergence of far-right extremism.

Perhaps the greatest failure of the interim government has been its inability to properly fulfil the role of a neutral arbiter in maintaining the unity and cooperative spirit among the various political parties involved in the anti-fascist struggle. As mentioned earlier, this government is exceptionally strong in the sense that it enjoys widespread support not only from the general public but also from nearly all active political parties participating in the anti-fascist movement. Such a strong government — one that received unequivocal endorsement from all political parties on the very first day it assumed office — ought to have acted in a manner that fostered trust among the parties and preserved impartiality, so that even if disagreements arose among them, the government could mediate fairly and effectively. Unfortunately, the government has missed this opportunity, visibly failing to maintain neutrality. A perception has emerged among the public and political parties that the government favours a newly formed political party and its allies. Various statements, actions, and behaviours of government officials have repeatedly, sometimes overtly, revealed this bias. The inevitable consequence has been an unwelcome alienation between the government and all other political parties that are not allied with the new party — especially the country’s largest opposition party, the BNP. This alienation is deeply regrettable, as the BNP was the most persecuted party under the fascist rule — hundreds of its activists fell victim to enforced disappearance or murder, thousands were imprisoned, and hundreds of thousands were displaced — and it has since played the leading political role in the anti-fascist movement for nearly one and a half decades. Such an unfortunate distancing from the principal anti-fascist political force and its allies will undoubtedly hinder the government’s success and bring harm to the state. The hopeful sign is that the chief adviser of the interim government, Professor Muhammad Yunus, appears to have recognised this reality. His meeting in London with the acting chairman of the BNP is a clear indication of his awareness. However, there is little credible evidence to suggest that this understanding is shared by all advisers and other officials associated with the government. This is not a positive sign for the interim government.

Another pressing concern for the interim government is its failure to dispel the prevailing uncertainty surrounding the timing of the upcoming national election. Although the chief adviser — bringing a brief sense of relief and optimism to the political climate — has stated that the election will be held in February, conflicting remarks from some individuals associated with the government have reintroduced the ambiguity concerning the timing. In particular, statements and actions by leaders of the newly formed political party — widely perceived to enjoy the government’s goodwill and tacit support — have contributed to the belief that there is a significant possibility that the election may not take place as scheduled. Anyone with even a little political awareness would recognise that the more uncertain the prospect of a February election becomes, the wider the rift is likely to grow between the government and the BNP — the country’s largest political party — and its allies. The inevitable consequence of such a development would be a serious setback for the government. Yet, there appears to be little indication that either government-affiliated individuals or the leaders of the newly formed party and its partners — who seem to benefit from the current arrangement — fully grasp this impending risk.

From the above discussion, it might appear that I am taking an anti-government stance by placing greater emphasis on the government’s failures. However, such an impression would be mistaken. At the very outset of this article, I acknowledged the government’s successes. Undoubtedly, there are further achievements beyond those mentioned here. Similarly, the shortcomings and failures discussed in this piece are not exhaustive; there are certainly others as well. That said, it is true that I have placed more emphasis on the government’s mistakes. But this should not be interpreted as hostility towards the government. Rather, like many others, I genuinely wish for this government to succeed. Its success will be our collective success — because we were participants in the great and bloody popular uprising through which this government came into being. It was our sacrifices, small and great, and our courage that made this uprising successful. We are all founders of this government. If the government we established can move forward with minimal errors, only then can we ensure the ultimate victory of the popular uprising, and only then can we truly honour the memory of the martyrs who gave their lives in the struggle. However, in order for the government to proceed with minimal error, the first step must be to identify the mistakes that have already occurred. This piece is a modest attempt to do just that.

As a participant in the historic popular uprising of 2024 and as an optimistic individual, I hold the expectation that the interim government will recognise its mistakes and take prompt action to correct them. There are undoubtedly experienced and capable individuals within the government who possess the competence and expertise to determine the necessary corrective measures. In this article, I wish to highlight several urgent steps that the government could consider. These are as follows: (1) Publish an accurate list of those who were martyred during the uprising, provide adequate and dignified compensation to their families, and make all related information public. (2) Ensure the best possible medical treatment for those injured in the uprising and publicly release all relevant information. (3) Without resorting to any form of ‘choose and pick’, detain all individuals identified as fascist rulers, enablers of fascism, and intensifiers of fascism, and ensure that they face proper legal proceedings. (4) Encourage students to return to campuses and their studies instead of being involved in state power and administration. (5) Curb mob violence with a firm hand, discourage political extremism, and ensure the security and rights of progressive, liberal and dissenting individuals. (6) Avoid signing any international treaties or agreements that fall outside the scope of immediate national priorities. (7) Establish a fair and impartial relationship with all political parties so that they may regard the interim government as a neutral political arbiter. (8) Clearly announce the tenure of the government and the date of the national election, and explicitly inform the nation of the specific timeline for transferring state power to a democratically elected government.

Looking ahead, the core spirit of the great and bloody popular uprising — which we affectionately call a ‘revolution’, even if that term may not be academically precise — is the aspiration to build a democratic Bangladesh that is modern, tolerant, inspired by the ideals of equality, free from injustice and grounded in higher human values. Such a Bangladesh may not be built overnight. Rather, it will be the result of a sustained effort by future democratically elected governments who will gradually shape and solidify that vision. However, it is the responsibility of the present interim government to lay the foundation for this dream. This government, therefore, must succeed — and we must ensure its success through our collective efforts. Otherwise, we risk losing an opportunity that arises perhaps once in an era. That opportunity came to us on August 5, 2024, at the cost of immense bloodshed. To waste it now — through negligence or conspiracy — in the year 2025 would be a betrayal of the sacrifice of thousands of martyrs. This nation will not become a party to such betrayal; this nation will not allow such betrayal to happen. That is our solemn pledge today, on this very day — the 5th of August, 2025.

Dr Mostofa Nazmul Mansur is professor of Philosophy at Jahangirnagar University.