‘When we are talking about justice, we mean justice, not revenge or retaliation’

Professor Sayeed Ferdous, an anthropologist and historian, also the current pro-vice-chancellor of the Bangladesh Open University, discusses with New Age the role of the University Teachers Network during the July mass uprising, as well as the significance of taking on the ideological struggles for an inclusive Bangladesh.

New Age: In the July mass uprising, the University Teachers Network played a vital role. The network held a convention at Jahangirnagar University in 2019, I recall. Tell us about the early days of its formation, including the academic and political environments that it spoke out against.

Sayeed Ferdous: The journey of this network has a longer history than its official existence. In this long journey, we have found allies, both old and new, in different public universities, allies who have raised voices against injustice within and outside their campuses for decades. In responding to the just demands of our students, these teachers from different campuses appeared as icons of trust and confidence. Besides, often university teachers had taken up initiatives to revisit the system and culture of higher education. On campuses like Jahangirnagar, Dhaka, or Rajshahi, there existed collectives, with or without a banner, who engaged themselves in laborious endeavours of keeping universities on track. Following the same historical trajectory, in 2006, a collective in Jahangirnagar, Shikkhok Moncho, organised a day-long programme involving colleagues from different public universities to respond to the World Bank’s Strategic Plan to reform the universities of Bangladesh. Sessions were designed based on position papers presented by faculties involved in the Shikkhok Moncho. However, such initiatives often suffered from interruptions — real-life situations distracted us. But we do not have the luxury to be bystanders. In 2014, a group of students of Rajshahi University, protesting the commercialisation of education by launching an evening programme, met ruthless police actions. Many were severely injured. Following the incident, colleagues from Rajshahi and Dhaka University organised a meeting in the teacher’s lounge of the Dhaka University Cafeteria. In that meeting a network was formed and named the Public University Teacher’s Network. The aim of the network was to resist the commercialisation of education and make critical engagement with the existing system of higher education. The PUTN had a short life, followed by the Independent Teacher’s Network, initiated by our colleagues from Dhaka University, but it had an even shorter life. Later, considering the significance of private universities and the colleagues working there, the network was reborn as the University Teachers Network and became a platform of teachers from both private and public universities. In 2019, the UTN organised a two-day convention at Jahangirnagar University addressing issues of higher education and its policy and structure.

New Age: The public universities provided the Hasina regime with the academic infrastructure to continue with the production of AL development propaganda as knowledge. Teachers en masse endorsed rigged elections. Reports surfaced that about 300 teachers met with Sheikh Hasina on July 30, 2024, and requested her to crush the movement. Many demanded that the list be made public. In the post-uprising Bangladesh, how do you, particularly as the serving pro-vice-chancellor of the Bangladesh Open University, go about undoing this ideological apparatus of complicity? What is the first step?

Sayeed Ferdous: To rally its foot soldiers on campuses, the past regime simultaneously employed ideological and coercive forces of different forms. Universities across the country opened different academic units to produce partisan accounts of the muktijudho. The Bangabandhu Institute of Comparative Literature and Culture at Jahangirnagar University is one of many such examples. The other effective weapon was bribery in different forms i.e., speed money for guaranteed recruitment in different positions or bribing with cumbersome development projects, encouraging corruptions. Partisan control over the university academic and administrative system has been a reality for a long time in Bangladeshi universities. Nepotism was institutionalised over the last decade and a half to the extreme. In recruitment, rules were bent, required qualifications had been lowered. These were empirically evident in campuses. Following their appointments, almost every new recruit — teachers, officers and staffs — had to prove their loyalty to the employer. At the end of the day, as you said, these recruits felt the responsibility to serve their patrons at any cost. Now, we all are aware that we need to fix the system and restore justice. However, witch-hunting is not the answer. Many universities have already formed inquiry committees to look into the academic, administrative and financial wrongdoings that had taken place during the past regime. I can see at least three challenges in this process: first, since the academic and administrative culture of the universities have been sharply partisan for decades, revenge may take over the process of justice. Second, in the last decade and a half, we witnessed a long list of bad recruits, recruitments on political, partisan consideration — sizeable enough to outnumber the others. Dislodging this monolith won’t be easy. Finally, a nexus of corrupt elements across different, even opposite, political/ideological camps would try their utmost to protect each other. Yet, setting up a transparent and accountable system of inquiry should be the first step. The following step will be to identify the responsible ones and bring them to justice. Their extent of wrongdoing would determine the nature of punishment, both in symbolic and concrete legal terms. Most importantly, universities should reclaim their long-forgotten commitment to academia above everything else, that it is primarily responsible for producing new knowledge.

New Age: The interim government has explicitly or implicitly tolerated the legal harassment of the intellectual and cultural class that provided unconditional support to the violently repressive Hasina regime. Some are now behind bars as under-trial accused in legally untenable murder cases. If not legally, how do we address ideological crimes?

Sayeed Ferdous: Those who had provided unconditional support to the repressive Hasina regime must be brought to justice. They should be punished according to the proportion of crimes and misdeeds they committed. However, we should keep in mind that when we are talking about justice, we mean justice, not revenge or retaliation. The legal process, from the beginning till conviction, should be precise, focused and flawless. Legal harassment, marked with untenable charges, would only miserably fail the public demand for justice. It is understandable that people who had gone through the worst suffering during the past regime would definitely look for revenge. Responding to their sentiment, or to populist demand, putting people behind the bar with charges that lack proper legal merit will only delay the justice. I believe two things should be our equal priority now. First and foremost, initiating a formal juridical process. It would at least assure the victims that justice is on its way. Besides, administrative and community-based mechanisms should be developed to address the issues of widespread human rights violations. Second, taking up a concerted effort to promote tolerance within the larger society — this is to learn to accept that everyone, even my enemy, has the equal right to this land, provided that they did not commit any crime against humanity. You can’t really wipe out an ideology from the society. Amidst an ideological war, forces may look for the annihilation of their opponents. In recent days, we have been hearing a call for burying ‘Mujibbaad.’ But there are thousands in this society who have embraced the ‘Mujibbaadi’ ideology throughout their entire lives. And most of them, I believe, did not extend their support for the regime’s prolonged repression, abduction and mass killing. Now, why would you aim to strip their ideology off from them? Embracing an ideology does not necessarily make someone a target for legal punishment or social harassment. You can only offer your perspective regarding the ideology they embraced. You can elaborate on why that ideology is deeply disturbing. But simultaneously, you would accept and acknowledge their right to live next to you. And that is the stepping-stone to attain an ‘inclusive’ Bangladesh.

New Age: Not to dwell on crime and complicity too long, let’s move on to the question of change. There is change. The shape of the governable future is now constantly debated, but the right-wing forces visibly appear to have an upper hand. However, for a new system to emerge, there is the need for the intellectual labour of reimagining the system. Some may argue that the reform commissions are doing so. Can the state be trusted with the work of reimagining the future, even if it is installed through a people’s uprising?

Sayeed Ferdous: State as a structure enjoys permanence over its office-bearing government. I will return to this point emphasising the difference between state and the government. True, the July Uprising has installed a government with promises of reforms. Commissions delivered their reports and, at the moment, are aiming for a national consensus on some broader issues. On their way to preparing reports, each commission had meetings with divergent stakeholders and tried to address and accommodate their concerns — although to an uneven extent. But often you would hear an accusation that those in the driving seat of reform are not adequately connected to this society, culture and politics. Some also noted that the consensus commission is an all-Bengali-Muslim-male entity. The question, therefore, is how far they would be able to offer a proper guideline for the change. The fact that the present government was installed following the uprising necessarily does not make it a ‘revolutionary’ government. Events that unfolded following the uprising made it clear — this government is an outcome of negotiations between major stakeholders of power — stakeholders from the ‘streets’ and those from the barracks. Furthermore, forces from the street were also multi-layered, complex, and, in some cases, conflicting within themselves. Not each of them had equal say in the process of government formation. Not each of them owns the government in a similar manner and extent. Besides this nature and mechanism of the government, I would also raise my concern about the nature of the state structure, which in many regards bears the legacy of the repressive regime. Hasina regime’s beneficiaries and foot soldiers — business tycoons, civil and military bureaucrats — are still very much in action within the state machineries. Given the scenarios, one may ask to what extent the call for reimagining the future is genuine and to what extent it contains the desire and dreams of the ordinary lives, who were keen for a real change and sacrificed their lives for minimum democratic rights.

New Age: In post-uprising Bangladesh, do you think the knowledge question in rebuilding and reimagining a future has been adequately dealt with or even considered?

Sayeed Ferdous: Unfortunately, the answer is negative. The post-uprising Bangladesh has been suffering from the rush of the political actors to secure their power share. The discursive arena of reimagining the future is taken over by parochialism and petty group interest. Little progress has been achieved in the true sense of reform. Veteran political actors seem to be comfortable playing by the age-old rules and norms of Bangladeshi politics. Young Turks appeared in the arena with lots of promises. They have commissioned catchy phrases like ‘noya bondobosto’ (new political arrangement), ‘bohuttobaad’ (pluralism) and ‘moddhyopontha’ (centrism). Initially, people relied on them and believed in them as change-makers. However, in practice, new promises produced little more than lip service. It seems their thrust to consolidate a strong position in the electoral politics compelled the leadership to bend to populism at its worst, relying on the worst forms of xenophobia, misogyny and communalism. The past regime played its cards, highlighting the fault line between secularists and the Islamists. Unfortunately, politics in the new Bangladesh could hardly transcend that bipolar frame. Society would never be a monolith. There will be divergent groups with political ideologies. In our case, diverse political forces that contributed to the uprising, setting aside their political differences, became keen to aggressively assert their respective positions and politics in the post-uprising Bangladesh. This is nothing unexpected. However, the emerging forces, particularly their leadership, have to understand that asserting difference should have regard for a tolerant and inclusive society. To uphold such a tolerant position requires much-needed wisdom to reform our land and its people. A lack of that political wisdom and foresight, especially for the people enjoying power or close to power at this moment, may confuse revenge with justice; it often appears as if they are contemplating the annihilation of the ‘other’ in their way of asserting their own position. Neither the new rights of today nor the old lefts from yesterday seemed to address the issue of tolerance adequately. The fear and hatred toward the ‘other’ disabled our capacity to be self-critical, to be accommodative.

Interview is taken by Saydia Gulrukh.