HOPE AND FRAGILITY: Democratic crossroads

by Md Motiar Rahman

THE July-August uprising marked a pivotal moment in the nation’s democratic journey, sparked off by a student-led anti-quota movement that quickly transformed into a nationwide call for a regime change. Fuelled by widespread anger over electoral fraud, authoritarian rule, repression, misgovernance and entrenched corruption, the protests drew support from diverse segments of society, including students, youth, professionals, political parties, and civil society. Characterised by spontaneous mass mobilisation, digital activism and acts of civil disobedience, the movement evolved beyond a typical protest into a fully-fledged mass uprising. The government’s violent crackdown, including the killing and injuring of a large number of unarmed demonstrators, further galvanised public resistance and undermined its legitimacy, ultimately leading to the fall of the Sheikh Hasina administration. Although not a complete revolution, the uprising signified a decisive break from the prevailing political order and a collective demand for democratic transformation.

Mass uprisings have historically marked critical turning points in national trajectories, but their long-term outcomes depend on the strength of institutions, civil-military dynamics and inclusive political processes. The 2022 Sri Lankan uprising illustrates how public revolt can bring change, toppling a corrupt regime, but also how economic reforms without accountability can leave public disappointment unresolved. Sri Lanka’s experience mirrors broader global patterns, Tunisia’s relative success through inclusive dialogue, Egypt and Myanmar’s regression into militarised rule and Sudan’s ongoing struggle for civilian leadership. For countries like Bangladesh, these experiences underscore the need for robust institutions, justice, the rule of law, security sector reforms and inclusive governance. However, post-uprising societies also face complex challenges, including instability, economic setbacks, political polarisation, vigilante violence and misinformation, which require sustained leadership, community engagement and the reconciliation of dissenting voices to overcome.

The interim government formed in the wake of the 2024 uprising, led by Nobel laureate Dr Muhammad Yunus, reflected the deep desire of the public for sweeping institutional reform and a return to democratic governance. In response, the government launched comprehensive reform initiatives with six commissions addressing electoral, police, judicial, anti-corruption, administrative, and constitutional issues, notably excluding the education sector. Based on the reports, the consensus commission, chaired by Dr Ali Riaz, sought to promote political dialogues and democratic recovery. However, its impact remained limited becasue of minimal political engagement, the absence of enforcement powers and a general lack of public confidence.

Politics: The political landscape is marked by deep polarisation, institutional weakness and a crisis of legitimacy. Despite efforts to restore democracy through reform initiatives and the consensus commission, political division, the absence of local representation and ongoing public unrest persisted. Entrenched rivalries and mutual distrust among key actors continued to obstruct reconciliation, leaving the volatile political situation for future democratic governance.

Meanwhile, the National Citizen Party, emerging from the July 2024 uprising, was formally launched on February 28, 2025, under the coalition of student activists. With a bold vision for a ‘second republic’ rooted in a new democratic constitution, meritocracy and inclusive governance, the party initially generated strong enthusiasm. especially among the youth, and symbolically embraced religious and gender inclusivity. However, its journey has been turbulent, marked by internal factionalism stemming from ideological diversity and hindered by weak grassroots organisation, limited funding and lack of charismatic leadership. Despite these challenges and resistance from mainstream parties, the NCP’s future remains cautiously promising. Its potential to become a meaningful third force in politics will depend on its ability to consolidate support, maintain ideological coherence and offer credible, reform-oriented alternatives to disillusioned voters.

Economy: Bangladesh’s economic condition has remained fragile and uncertain. The aftermath of the 2024 uprising disrupted key sectors, leading to declining GDP growth, rising nflation, and a sharp decline in foreign direct investment. Major infrastructure projects were suspended amid corruption concern while the government prioritised stabilising food and energy supplies and reviving employment in the apparel and remittance sectors. Efforts to restructure vaue-added tax and seek emergency support from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank were undertaken, but policy paralysis and the government’s limited mandate hindered meaningful structural reforms. The banking sector, plagued by non-performing loans and governance failures, further weakened investor confidence and contributed to economic stagnation.

Administration: In the wake of the uprising, the interim government, composed of technocrats, retired civil servants and professionals, embarked on a mission to restore public trust, reactivate democratic institutions and ensure a credible electoral process. A key step was the purge of bureaucrats complicit in the previous authoritarian regime, paving the way for a non-partisan transitional administration. Central to its reform agenda was the overhaul of the Election Commission, which had for long been criticised for its role in electoral manipulation. The interim government prioritised depoliticising the Election Commission, introducing transparent appointment processes, revising its legal framework, verifying voter rolls and deploying digital tools for electoral oversight. However, drawing on regional and global examples, it is evident that electoral reform alone cannot ensure democracy unless accompanied by institutional neutrality, a robust, secure environment, political maturity and broad public consensus.

Criminal justice system: The central challenge for the interim government has been addressing transitional ustice, amid widespread demands for accountability over enforced disappearances, orture, and political repression under the previous regime. One of the government’s most visible early achievements was the swift reform of the justice system, removing politicised officials, reinstating merit-based appointment and restructuring the judiciary. This culminated in the resignation of five Appellate Division judges and the appointment of the chief justice, widely seen as a move to depoliticise the judiciary. Additionally, the ratification of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances and the launch of a commission of inquiry into past rights abuses signalled a decisive shift from the previous regime’s repressive practices. Moreover, Bangladesh’s interim government signed a three-year memorandum of understanding with the UN rights body, the OHCHR, to establish a permanent mission in Dhaka for promoting and protecting rights. The government also restructured the International Crimes Tribunal to prosecute crimes against humanity committed during the 2024 movement.

Security sector: Security-sector reform, particularly of paramilitary forces, the police and intelligence agencies, is essential for rebuilding public trust and dismantling the deeply rooted culture of impunity within law enforcement. Core reform proposals emphasised depoliticising these institutions, enhancing accountability, and embedding human rights principles into training. However, the government limited its efforts by establishing a reform commission solely for the police. In the case of the police, the most crucial reform agenda is the creation of an independent oversight body to shield the police from political interference while ensuring accountability for misconduct. Additionally, breaking free from the colonial legacy of the Police Act 1861 is deemed essential for establishing a professional, accountable, and modern police force.

In this context, the recommendations of the reform commission were largely superficial and failed to address deep-rooted structural problems. The police chief’s public expression of dissatisfaction with the reform commission’s report reflected a deep institutional desire for genuine and transformative change. Even the limited proposals it put forward were deliberately excluded from the consensus commission’s political dialogues, dismissed on the pretext that the ministry could implement them independently, a pretext that ultimately stalled any meaningful reform. Despite the intelligence outfit and the police’s history as an instrument of authoritarian repression, implicated in extrajudicial activities and widespread violence, including the killing and injuring of demonstrators during the uprising, the coercive machinery remained largely unreformed. This inaction poses a serious risk of the force reverting to its former role.

In the aftermath of the uprising, a period of political reawakening was accompanied by a weakening of state authority, leading to a surge in street crime, extortion, vigilante violence, political clashes and mass demonstrations. This widespread unrest reflected growing public frustration over unmet demands and a deteriorating sense of law and order, particularly in urban peripheries and rural areas where traditional governance structures and informal justice mechanisms collapsed. The mass resignation of elected local government representatives further deepened the governance vacuum at the grassroots level. The overall police response was hampered by the absence of substantive institutional reforms and low morale, particularly after the deaths of 44 police personnel during the uprising. Despite these constraints, the police generally maintained restraint, with no reported cases of enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings or custodial deaths. However, unresolved security breaches, such as the escape of convicted criminals and the looting of weapons and ammunition, continue to threaten overall security. Against this backdrop of institutional erosion and public mistrust, the ability of the police to ensure a free, fair and credible national election remains highly challenging.

International relations: Under the interim government, India-Bangladesh relations experienced a period of strain, largely influenced by close ties between India and Sheikh Hasina, which cast a long shadow over the new leadership’s efforts to assert neutrality and redefine foreign policy priorities. New Delhi’s perceived preference for the former regime created diplomatic unease, while Dhaka’s attempts to diversify its international partnerships, particularly through closer engagement with China, Pakistan and regional actors, raised alarm in India. The interim government’s review of bilateral agreements, coupled with the absence of high-level political dialogue, rising nationalist rhetoric on both sides, unresolved border and river water disputes, extradition of Sheikh Hasina and the cancellation of energy and defence agreements, and antagonistic media narratives, further deepened mistrust and contributed to the cooling of what had once been a cooperative and strategically significant relationship.

The escalating conflict between the Arakan Army and Myanmar’s military, alongside the Rohingya crisis and the proposed UN-backed humanitarian corridor, has created serious geopolitical and humanitarian challenges for the interim government. As fighting intensified in Rakhine, fears of a renewed Rohingya influx emerged, adding to the strain of hosting over a million refugees. The humanitarian corridor proposal placed Bangladesh in a difficult position, trying to uphold humanitarian duties while managing national security and navigating complex regional dynamics involving China and India. The prolonged conflict has further obstructed Rohingya repatriation efforts and invited domestic and international criticism, undermining the interim government’s efforts to demonstrate stability and effective foreign policy leadership.

Freedom of expression: The press freedom and the freedom of expression have remained constrained despite initial commitments to upholding democratic principles. Civil society groups and international watchdogs like Human Rights Watch and Reporters Without Borders reported ongoing censorship, intimidation, and pressure on media outlets to avoid sensitive topics such as transitional justice, elite accountability and security affairs. Although Bangladesh rose 16 spots in the 2025 World Press Freedom Index, surpassing India, Pakistan and Bhutan, this improvement failed to reflect deeper structural issues, as legal reforms remained absent and a climate of surveillance persisted. Years of coercion have fostered widespread self-censorship among journalists, underscoring the fragile and contested nature of media freedom in the country, especially ahead of the forthcoming elections.

Sections of the youth and civil society who had played a pivotal role in the historic uprising that toppled the authoritarian regime, an unprecedented moment in the nation’s political history, have grown increasingly disillusioned with the perceived sluggish pace of transformation. While the interim government took steps to dismantle elite corruption, broader demands for deep-rooted economic reforms and meaningful social justice remain largely unfulfilled, fuelling frustration among those who once championed change. Nonetheless, there is a collective hope across the nation for a peaceful and credible transition of power through the upcoming elections. The next elected government will carry the critical responsibility of not only restoring democratic legitimacy but also steering Bangladesh towards a future marked by inclusive growth, justice, and national achievement.

In conclusion, the post-uprising situation reflects both hope and fragility. The uprising demonstrated the power of people’s movements in reclaiming democratic space, but sustaining that momentum requires more than a change in leadership. It demands a deep restructuring of institutions, a culture of accountability, and the cultivation of inclusive politics that transcends party rivalry. The forthcoming general election, if conducted freely and fairly, will serve as a crucial litmus test, not only for the restoration of democracy but also for determining whether the aspirations of the 2024 uprising can be transformed into a durable and inclusive democratic future.

Md Motiar Rahman is a retired deputy inspector general of police.