Strategic equilibrium between Bangladesh and India

A graffito painted on a wall in Dhaka during the July uprising reads, ‘We demand an end to US, Indian, and British hegemony.’ — New Age/Sony Ramani

by Zillur Rahman

SOUTH Asia is entering another phase of geopolitical recalibration. Domestic political changes, shifting economic networks and evolving security dynamics are reshaping the strategic landscape of the region. Few bilateral relationships illustrate these transformations more clearly than that between Bangladesh and India. Bound by geography yet often divided by perception, the relationship has simultaneously experienced deep cooperation and recurring tensions. Over the past decade Dhaka and New Delhi have expanded connectivity, strengthened security cooperation and deepened economic engagement. Yet unresolved issues — border killings, water sharing disputes, trade imbalances and political mistrust — continue to shape public sentiment in Bangladesh. As Bangladesh approaches a renewed democratic political phase and leaders in both countries’ express optimism about rebuilding cooperation, the challenge is how to establish a stable strategic equilibrium between two neighbours whose relationship is defined as much by asymmetry as by interdependence.

Geography alone ensures that the destinies of Bangladesh and India remain closely intertwined. The two countries share a border of approximately 4,096 kilometres, one of the longest international borders in the world. Unlike many geopolitical frontiers, this boundary runs through densely populated regions, agricultural lands and river systems where communities historically interacted across both sides. As scholars of South Asian regional politics have long observed, borders in this region are rarely merely lines of separation; they are also spaces of economic activity, migration and social exchange.

Managing such a border inevitably produces tensions. Over the years, incidents involving civilian deaths along the frontier have generated anger in Bangladesh and periodically strained bilateral relations. Human rights organisations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have documented cases in which Bangladeshi citizens were killed during anti-smuggling operations or while attempting to cross the border. Although the governments of both countries have repeatedly committed themselves to a ‘zero killing’ policy, sporadic incidents continue to occur. These incidents carry a political weight that goes far beyond their numbers, reinforcing the perception among many Bangladeshis that the bilateral relationship remains structurally unequal.

At the same time, the border also reflects legitimate security concerns for India. Several northeastern states of India have historically experienced insurgent movements and cross-border militant networks. For New Delhi, preventing the use of Bangladeshi territory as a haven for such groups has long been a priority. In recent years, Bangladesh has taken significant steps to address these concerns. Security cooperation between the two countries has improved substantially, and Dhaka’s actions against insurgent groups have been acknowledged by Indian policymakers as an important contribution to stability in India’s northeast. This cooperation illustrates how shared security interests can strengthen bilateral relations when mutual trust exists.

Water sharing represents another critical dimension of the Bangladesh–India relationship. Bangladesh is a lower-riparian country through which more than 50 transboundary rivers flow from India. As a result, upstream water management decisions taken in India directly affect agriculture, fisheries and environmental sustainability in Bangladesh. The Ganges Water Sharing Treaty, signed in 1996, remains a major milestone in regional water diplomacy. The treaty established a framework for sharing the dry season flow of the Ganges at the Farakka Barrage and significantly reduced tensions over water allocation. However, the agreement was signed for a 30-year period and is due for renewal in 2026. Its upcoming renewal will, therefore, become an important test of the ability of the two countries to manage shared river systems in an era of climate change and increasing water demand.

While the Ganges treaty demonstrated that water disputes can be resolved through negotiation, the unresolved Teesta River agreement continues to generate frustration in Bangladesh. Negotiations between Dhaka and New Delhi produced a draft arrangement more than a decade ago, but the agreement has remained stalled due to domestic political considerations within India, particularly opposition from the government of West Bengal. For Bangladesh, where the Teesta River is crucial for irrigation in northern districts, the absence of a formal water-sharing arrangement has both economic and symbolic significance. Many Bangladeshis interpret the delay as evidence that their country’s concerns are not receiving adequate priority in bilateral diplomacy.

Economic relations between the two countries have expanded considerably over the past two decades. India has become one of Bangladesh’s largest trading partners and bilateral trade has grown rapidly. According to data from the World Bank and the Bangladesh Ministry of Commerce, trade between the two countries now amounts to several billions of dollars annually. However, the trade balance remains heavily skewed in India’s favour. Bangladesh imports a wide range of goods from India, including industrial raw materials, agricultural products and machinery, while Bangladeshi exports to India remain relatively limited. Economists often argue that logistical constraints, non-tariff barriers and regulatory challenges continue to restrict Bangladesh’s access to the Indian market.

Trade deficits between unequal economies are not unusual. Yet in politically sensitive relationships they often acquire symbolic importance. In Bangladesh, the trade gap is frequently cited as an example of the structural asymmetry that characterises the relationship with India. Addressing this imbalance through expanded market access and improved trade facilitation would therefore contribute not only to economic cooperation but also to political confidence.

Connectivity has emerged as one of the most visible pillars of Bangladesh–India cooperation in recent years. Rail links that were severed during the partition of the subcontinent have gradually been restored, road corridors have expanded and inland water transport routes have been revived. Bangladesh has also allowed India to use its territory to transport goods to the country’s northeastern states. These arrangements significantly reduce travel distance and logistical costs compared with the traditional route through the narrow Siliguri Corridor.

For India, connectivity through Bangladesh is closely linked to both economic development and national security. The northeastern states of India are connected to the rest of the country through the narrow Siliguri Corridor, often described as the ‘Chicken’s Neck’, which at its narrowest point measures barely 20 kilometres. Historically this geographical constraint contributed to economic isolation and security vulnerabilities in the region. Improved connectivity through Bangladesh offers India a more efficient route to integrate its northeastern states with broader national and regional markets.

For Bangladesh, however, connectivity must be perceived as mutually beneficial. Transit arrangements that primarily facilitate Indian trade without generating visible gains for Bangladesh risk producing domestic political criticism. Connectivity, therefore, needs to be structured in a way that strengthens Bangladesh’s own economic position, including by turning the country into a regional transport hub linking South Asia with Southeast Asia.

Beyond economic and technical considerations, political perceptions have also influenced the trajectory of Bangladesh–India relations. Over the past decade many Bangladeshi observers have expressed frustration over what they perceive as India’s unwavering support for the previous government in Bangladesh despite international concerns about democratic governance. Critics have argued that India’s foreign policy during this period prioritised geopolitical stability and security cooperation over democratic principles. Whether entirely fair or not, this perception contributed to a degree of resentment within sections of Bangladeshi society.

These sentiments became particularly visible during the political upheaval that led to the formation of Bangladesh’s interim government. During this transitional period diplomatic relations between Dhaka and New Delhi experienced visible tension. Political rhetoric occasionally hardened and debates about foreign policy direction intensified within Bangladesh. The interim government also sought to diversify Bangladesh’s international partnerships by strengthening engagement with a wider range of global actors.

Yet the structural realities of geography ensure that cooperation between Bangladesh and India remains indispensable. India relies on Bangladesh for stability along its eastern frontier and for connectivity with its northeastern region. Bangladesh benefits from trade, cross-border energy cooperation and access to regional markets. In this sense the relationship is not optional for either country; it is a strategic necessity.

The prospect of democratic elections in Bangladesh now creates an opportunity to recalibrate the relationship. Many observers believe that a democratically elected government in Dhaka could help rebuild trust between the two neighbours. Statements from leaders in both countries suggest cautious optimism and a willingness to engage constructively. If approached with sensitivity and mutual respect, the coming political phase could allow both countries to address unresolved grievances while strengthening areas of cooperation.

International experience offers useful lessons for managing asymmetrical relationships between neighbouring states. The relationship between the United States and Mexico demonstrates how large disparities in economic power can be managed through structured trade agreements and institutionalised dialogue. In Europe, historically unequal neighbours such as Germany and Poland have developed stable partnerships through economic integration and cooperative institutions. These examples show that asymmetry does not necessarily lead to instability if mechanisms exist to manage differences and ensure mutual benefit.

For Bangladesh and India, maintaining strategic equilibrium will require deliberate policy choices from both sides. Border management must prioritise both security and human dignity, with renewed efforts to prevent civilian casualties. Water diplomacy must move forward urgently, particularly regarding the Teesta agreement and the upcoming renewal of the Ganges treaty. Economic cooperation should focus on addressing structural trade imbalances and improving market access for Bangladeshi exports.

Connectivity projects should continue, but they must produce clear and visible benefits for both countries. Bangladesh’s potential role as a regional transport hub should translate into tangible economic gains, while India’s legitimate security and development concerns in its northeastern region should also be addressed through cooperative mechanisms. Regular strategic dialogue between Dhaka and New Delhi could provide an institutional platform for addressing emerging challenges before they escalate into larger disputes.

Bangladesh and India are bound together by geography in ways that cannot be altered. Their shared rivers, borders and economic networks ensure that their futures will remain interconnected. The challenge for policymakers in both countries is to transform this structural interdependence into a balanced partnership that commands public confidence on both sides of the border.

If the coming political phase leads to renewed trust, transparent cooperation and a willingness to address longstanding grievances, Bangladesh–India relations could enter a more stable and mature chapter. In a region often marked by rivalry and mistrust, a balanced and forward-looking partnership between these two neighbours would not only benefit their own citizens but also contribute to the broader stability of South Asia.

Zillur Rahman is a political analyst and president at the Centre for Governance Studies (CGS). He is the host of ‘Tritiyo Matra’ on Channel i. His X handle is @zillur.